


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Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP81M00980R001400080104-4

OLC 78-1467/1  
13 APR 1978



MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM :   
Acting Legislative Counsel

SUBJECT : Procedures for Intelligence Community  
Program Managers Handling Congressional  
Requests for Information on Liaison  
Services

REFERENCE : Your Memorandum for the Record dated  
7 April 1978, Paragraph 6

1. (U) Action Requested: None, for information only.

2. (C) Background: The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence has as you are aware requested that DIA provide a list of their foreign liaison counterparts and DIA has apparently promised to provide this list. This requirement of DIA coupled with a 9 November 1977 (attached) request from the Committee to you to provide detailed summaries of all intelligence agreements -- written and oral -- have provided the impetus for two gatherings of NFIB representatives to discuss procedures for handling these kinds of requests. Meetings were held on 5 April and 11 April in the Resource Management Staff Building and were chaired by General Jack Thomas. Two draft papers have been re-worked and hopefully a more polished recommendation will be arriving on your desk from Resource Management Staff within a few days. The positions taken by the NFIB representatives may not be palatable to the congressional oversight committees but are essentially identical to the informal agreement worked out between the former DDCI (Hank Knoche) and the former Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (Senator Daniel K. Inouye (D., Hawaii)).

The current thinking is that the paper which will be presented to you would be for your subsequent informal issuance to Intelligence Community program managers for handling of subsequent inquiries on liaison agreements


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25X1

**CONFIDENTIAL**

and arrangements. In essence, the position being taken is to limit responses to identification of the country involved, U.S. manpower and fiscal resources, and, where necessary, summaries of the foreign intelligence or counterintelligence product acquired as a result of the liaison activities. More will be forthcoming on this but this memorandum should serve to reassure you that work is being done on this issue.



25X1

Attachment

**CONFIDENTIAL**

UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET
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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Routing Slip

TO: \_\_\_\_\_

#	NAME	ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	DDI/DO		X		
4	DDI/DO/CT		X		
5	DDA		X		
6	DDO		X		
7	DDP		X		
8	LC	X (Paragraph 6)			
9	CC		X		
10					
11					
12	ES		X		

SUSPENSE \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

Remarks:

Executive Secretary  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Date

25X1

SECRET

State Dept. Registry
78-8798

7 APR 1978

78-1467

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Secretary of Defense,  
6 April 1978

1. I gave the Secretary a debriefing on my trip.
2. The Secretary raised the question of charters. He had had breakfast with Senator Bayh this morning. I described the letter I was about to sign setting up the working group under Tony Lapham and outlining the principal issues. I said it would be my intent that this group would resolve all differences which could be resolved within the intelligence community and then send to the SCC only those issues which could not be resolved at the working level. I suggested that we would want to go to the SCC possibly on a title-by-title basis in order to be able to negotiate as much as possible with the Senate Select Committee prior to our appearing before it in testimony. I stressed that we wanted to avoid asking the Committee to change its position in public hearings. Secretary Brown and Secretary Duncan both agreed that I should send the letter and that we should proceed with these guidelines.

I also mentioned that I was anxious that we not let our working levels use the charter exercise to try to change the Administration position as enunciated in Executive Order 12036. Secretary Brown said there were some ambiguities in the Executive Order which, if the Senate attempted to clarify, would inevitably lead to some jockeying of this sort. Both he and Secretary Duncan, however, indicated that they agreed we should use the Executive Order as the base line of an Administration position and not deliberately attempt to change it.

3. On the 62 billets for RMS/NITC, Secretary Brown said they couldn't provide the number of supergrades we wanted. He was working with the number of 16. I told him we only wanted five; he said Dan Murphy had indicated they were willing to offer three. I said let's try four.

E2 IMPDET  
CL BY DCI

4. He wanted to go to OMB and the Congress with the position that 62 DoD spaces would not come from inside the DoD portions of the NFIP. Instead, they would come as a transfer from DoD into the NFIP. In short, there would be an increase in the NFIP end strength and money but a proportionate decrease in the DoD budget. The reason for wanting to do this is that if the Congress tries to take away the 62 positions and not give them to the RMS/NITC, Defense will not lose them since they will not have had to identify them from amongst the glob of several million DoD people. I agreed with this "if it would work " 25X1


[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b. The Secretary was suggesting that the errors in the study were such that we ought to make an amendment to it. I expressed reservations as to whether you could do that with something that basically was as subjective as this, but suggested that DoD submit to us their specific recommended changes. 25X1

[Redacted]

6. I raised the issue of whether DIA should provide a list of foreign liaison to the HPSCI. He indicated they didn't have any equity in this but were willing to take the DCI's lead as to what the community policy should be. I therefore think we're going to have to get into the act in between the program managers and the HPSCI in negotiating with the HPSCI on this situation.

  
STANSFIELD TURNER  
Director

APR 7 4 54 PM '78

ER

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 MICHAEL J. O'NEIL, CHIEF COUNSEL

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# U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

## PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

November 9, 1977

Section 505  
 77-2786

CLS #77-4876

HSCI  
 77-0039/8

Chrono

letters were not sent  
 30 november briefing  
 took care of it.

Honorable Stansfield Turner  
 Director of Central Intelligence  
 Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Admiral Turner:

On November 3, 1977, this Committee met to discuss the most appropriate procedures to assure a thorough legislative review of covert action and sensitive intelligence collection operations. The Committee approved a set of guidelines and I am writing to inform you about them, and to ask your cooperation in helping the Committee meet its obligations in this area.

The first guideline approved by the Committee has to do with the operations which it believes ought to be reported to the Committee. The Committee wishes to know, of course, about covert actions (as required by the Hughes-Ryan Amendment); but it also wants to be informed about sensitive intelligence collection operations which are or might be directed against American citizens, carry a high risk of political damage to the United States if exposed, are large or costly, have a high risk of exposure, or are particularly important in their objectives. The Committee would like you, as Director of the intelligence community, to require the appropriate officials to report to the Committee on sensitive intelligence collection operations which have these characteristics, and to respond to these general reporting criteria in an inclusive manner. (In addition to the many items that would naturally fall within these criteria, the Committee wants to receive detailed summaries of all intelligence agreements--written and oral--reached with other nations, including agreements falling both inside and outside the usual reporting to Congress under the Case-Zablocki Act.)

In a related set of guidelines, the Committee approved a recommendation requiring the DCI to report to me and to the Committee Staff Director, Thomas K. Latimer, within

24 hours that a Presidential finding on covert action has been made, or that a highly sensitive intelligence collection operation is scheduled to begin.


Also, to keep itself continually informed on sensitive intelligence activities, the Committee wishes to receive quarterly briefings on the status of covert actions and important collection operations. We would like the final quarterly briefing to include an annual report on these activities. Moreover, at the time of the quarterly reviews, the Committee wishes to be informed about the termination of any covert action or sensitive collection operation, and its outcome.

Lastly, the Committee would like you to visit us again as soon as possible to follow through on your introductory briefing on covert action. We would now like to be told in depth about each of the major covert actions you summarized on your October 19 visit. Without getting into the names of agents and assets, the Committee would like to know in some detail the objectives, targets, methods, source of authority and extent of policy coordination associated with each operation. At this same time, we would like you to brief us in full on CIA activities, if any, within or against Jamaica since 1952. As you know, allegations have appeared in the press regarding CIA assassination attempts against Jamaican Prime Minister Michael Manley; the Committee has an obligation to examine these charges.

The guidelines I have outlined here represent only a first step toward determining workable and thorough procedures for the regular review of sensitive intelligence programs. The Committee will further shape and refine its methods, in cooperation with you, as time passes. We continue to hope and trust that the intelligence community and the House of Representatives can work together in the best interests of the country to develop an effective program of legislative oversight in the intelligence field.

With every good wish, I am,

Sincerely yours,

  
EDWARD P. BOLAND  
Chairman

cc: Honorable Zbigniew Brzezinski  
Assistant to the President

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SUBJECT: (Optional)

ER 78-8798/1

FROM   
Acting Legislative Counsel

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

14 April 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. DDCI

14 APR 1978

4/17/78 fep/m

For your information--  
in response to your  
suggestion that we should  
get into the act between  
the program managers and  
the House Permanent Select  
Committee on Intelligence  
with regard to furnishing  
lists of foreign liaison  
relationships to Congress.

2.

3. ~~DDCI~~

4. OBE → Return

5. to OLC

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.